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THF BILL OF RIGHTS AND NATIONAL SYMBOLS: FLAG
DESECRATION
People v. Radich, 26 N. Y.2d 114, 257 N.E.2d 30, 308 N. Y.S.2d 846
(1970), appeal docketed, No. 169,19 U.S.L. W. 3013 (U.S. 5-18-70)
I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America and to
the Republic for which it stands, one Nation under God, indivisible, with
liberty and justice for all.
What was once an easy, automatic rite of patriotism has become in many
cases a considered political act, burdened with overtones and conflicting
meanings greater than Old Glory was ever meant to bear ...
Some, mostly the defiant young, blow their noses on it, sleep in it, set it
afire, or wear it to patch the seat of their trousers. In response, others
wave it with defensive pride, crack skulls in its name, and fly it from their
garbage trucks, police cars and skyscraper scaffolds.
Time, July 6, 1970, at 12.
Radich, an art gallery proprietor and art dealer, was arrested for
publicly displaying in his gallery several "constructions" which
included, as a part of their composition, American flags.' He was
subsequently convicted for violation of the New York flag desecration
statute, which provides: "Any person who shall. . . publicly mutilate,
deface, trample upon, or cast contempt upon either by word or act...
the flag of the United States of America. .. shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor." ' 2 Arguing that his "act" of displaying the art work was a
protected expression of protest to the United States' involvement in
Indochina, 3 defendant appealed. Held: Incidental suppression of
expression under a flag desecration statute is a permissable infringement
of first amendment activity if the statute is reasonably and primarily
designed to insure the preservation of public order.4 Thus, because the
legislative purpose of the New York law is to prevent conduct which may
provoke breaches of the peace, convictions for "acts" in violation of the
statute, even if the act is intended to serve as a form of expression, are
not unconstitutional under the first amendment.
f. People v. Radich, 53 Misc.2d 717, 279 N.Y.S.2d 680 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1967), affd, 26
N.Y.2d 114. 257 N.E.2d 30, 308 N.Y.S.2d 846 (1970), appeal docketed, no. 169, 39 U.S.L.W.
3013 (U.S. May 18, 1970). The constructions included: an erect penis wrapped in a flag, a flag in
the form of a body hanging from a yellow noose, the flag attached to a two wheeled vehicle, the
union of the flag depicted in the form of an octopus and others. See also Life, March 31, 1967, at
18
2. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1425(16)(d) (1909) [now N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 136 (McKinney)].
3. People v. Radich, 26 N.Y.2d 114, 257 N.E.2d 30, 31, 308 N.Y.S.2d 846, 847 (1970).
4. Id. at _ 257 N.E.2d at 36, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 854.
517
Washington University Open Scholarship
518 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1970: 517
I. EARLY DEVELOPMENT AND BACKGROUND
Between 1895 and 1906, in response to lobbying efforts of the
American Flag Association and widespread abuse of the flag for both
commercial and political advertising campaigns--during the heated
1896 presidential campaign, flags were used by all parties, and
repeatedly torn and trampled--more than half the states enacted flag-
protective legislation.' The Supreme Court, reversing a contrary trend in
state courts,7 held these statutes constitutional in Halter v. Nebraska.'
The Court in that decision, noting the patriotic motivation for
Nebraska's prohibition of the use of the flag in advertising, concluded:
From the earliest periods in the history of the human race, banners,
standards, and ensigns have been adopted as symbols of the power and
history of the peoples who bore them . . . . To every true American the
flag is the symbol of the nation's power-the emblem of freedom in its
truest, best sense. It is not extravagant to say that to all lovers of the
country it signifies government resting on the consent of the governed;
liberty regulated by law; the protection of the weak against the strong;
security against the exercise of arbitrary power; and absolute safety for
free institutions against foreign aggression. As the statute in question
evidently had its origin in a purpose to cultivate a feeling of patriotism
among the people of Nebraska, we are unwilling to adjudge that in
legislation for that purpose the state erred in duty or has infringed the
constitutional right of anyone. On the contrary, it may reasonably be
affirmed to encourage its people to love the Union with which the state is
indissolubly connected.
No American, nor any foreign born person who enjoys the privileges of
American citizenship, ever looks upon [the flag] without taking pride in
the fact that he lives under this free government. Hence, it has often
occurred that insults to the flag have been the cause of war, and indignities
put upon it, in the presence of those who revere it, have often been resented
and sometimes punished on the spot.I (Emphasis added)
The blank check provided in Halter for patriotically motivated
5. UNIFORM FLAG AcT, Commissioner's Prefatory Note at 48 (1966).
6. Id. at 49. See also Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34, 36 (1907); Note, Flag Burning, Flag
Waving and the Law, 4 VALPO. L. REV. 345 (1970).
7. E.g., Ruhstrat v. People, 185 I11. 133, 57 N.E. 41 (1900); People ex rel. McPike v. Van de
Carr, 91 App. Div. 20, 86 N.Y.S. 644, affd, 178 N.Y. 425 (1904).
8. 205 U.S. 34 (1907). Involved was Nebraska's prohibition of advertising use of the flag. The
defendant used a flag on his beer bottle label.
9. Id. at 42-43.
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legislation has been curtailed by subsequent decisions; of continuing
significance, however, is that portion of Halter which takes judicial
notice of "insults" to the flag as fighting words.
Patriotism and the promotion of loyalty to the flag lost their status as
overriding justifications for official action in West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette.0 That decision involved a state requirement of
a flag salute in public school exercises. Several Jehovah's Witnesses
refused to comply with the requirement of a salute on grounds of
religious freedom. Reversing its widely disapproved position of three
years previous in Minerville School District v. Gobitis," the Court ruled
that the first amendment limited the power of states to compel
patriotism or loyalty:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstandes
which permit an exception, they do not now occur to us.
We think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute
and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on their power and
invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First
Amendment of the Constitution to reserve from all official control. 12
Symbolic conduct, as that term is now popularly used, describes
conduct which utilizes "speech" and "non-speech" elements for the
communication of an idea which, if spoken, would be protected under
the first amendment.' 3 Apart from the protected "speech", the state may
have a legitimate interest in regulating the particular conduct employed.
10, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). See generally D. MANWARING, RENDER UNTO CAESER: THE FLAG
SALUTE CONTROVERSY (1962).
1I, 310 US. 586(1940).
12, 319 U.S. at 642. Although Barnette involved a refusal grounded in the religious training of
Jehovah's Witnesses, the Court did not limit itself to a "freedom of worship" basis. Instead, the
Court held that the salute requirement would violate first amendment limitations on state action,
even if not violative of the freedom of worship itself. The Court stated:
While religion supplies appellee's motive for enduring the discomforts of making an issue in
this case, many citizens who do not share these religious views hold such a compulsory rite
to infringe constitutional liberty of the individual. It is not necessary to inquire whether non-
conformist beliefs will exempt from the duty to salute unless we first find power to make the
salute a legal duty.
Id at 634-35.
13. E.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Board of Education, 393 U.S. 503 (1969); United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). See generally Alfange, Jr., Free Speech and Symbolic Conduct: The
Draft-Card Burning Case, 1968 Sup. CT. REv. 1; Note, Symbolic Conduct, 68 COLUM. L. REv.
1091 (1968); 32 BROOK. L. REV. 334 (1966).
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A tragic and altogether too frequent example of such a case is political
assassination. The question, recently responded to by the Supreme Court
in O'Brien v. United States, 4 is the extent to which the state may
regulate the conduct where there is an incidental suppression of the
protected expression. In O'Brien, a draft card burning case, the Court
formulated four inter-related tests for the measurement of the
constitutionality of official proscription of such symbolic conduct. They
are: Whether the proscription is within the constitutional power of the
government; whether it furthers an important and substantial
governmental interest; whether that governmental interest is unrelated to
the suppression of first amendment expression; and whether the
"incidental restriction on alleged first amendment freedom is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." 5
A refusal to pledge allegiance to the flag could, depending on the
intent of the refusal, combine elements of speech and conduct sufficient
to amount to symbolic conduct. The Court in Barnette did not, however,
review the legislation in question in that case as a regulation of symbolic
conduct. Instead, the Court found that the salute and pledge requirement
was unconstitutional because it was designed to compel affirmative acts
of patriotism. Because flag desecration statutes are designed to prohibit
conduct directed toward the flag, rather than compel any affirmative act
of loyalty, Barnette's importance for such flag legislation is its implicit
proposition that a state cannot implement, under the guise of regulating
conduct, a legislative intent to coerce political orthodoxy.
Pragmatically, what this means is that the judiciary, before it can
sustain the constitutionality of flag desecration statutes, must find as
required in O'Brien that the statute was reasonably designed to further
some governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression.
The statute under which Radich was convicted has been before the
Court after O'Brien in Street v. New York. 6 Reacting to the wounding
of James Meredith in a civil rights march, Street burned a flag on a
crowded New York street corner accompanied by exclamations that:
"We don't need no damn flag!" Although the issues before the Court
were characterized in terms of flag burning as symbolic speech, a scant
trial record and a general verdict enabled the Court to entirely avoid
applying the O'Brien tests.' 7 In the first instance the Court determined
14. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
15. Id. at 377.
16. 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
17. Id. at 594.
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that the conviction could have been unconstitutionally based on Street's
words alone.' Second, the Court avoided application of Halter's
"fighting words" dictum to Street's advocacy. To do so, Justice Harlan,
grandson of the Justice who wrote Halter, characterized Street's words
not as insults to the flag but ". . . only . . . somewhat excited public
advocacy of the idea that the United States should abandon, at least
temporarily, one of its national symbols." 1 9 Based on this
characterization, Harlan was able to conclude: "It is clear that the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the states from imposing criminal
punishment for public advocacy of peaceful change in our
institutions."20
Radich, in view of its ample trial and appeal court record, may force
the Supreme Court to test flag desecration under O'Brien. However,
Street's contorted avoidance, and the similar avoidance (by emphasis on
equal protection over symbolic speech aspects of the case) in Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent School District,2 an armband case, seem to
indicate a Court unwilling to do so.
II. PROTECTION OF A NATIONAL SYMBOL OR PREVENTION OF
DISORDER?
Unless the changes in Court personnel which have occured since Street
lead the Court to reverse the majority position taken in that decision,2
the primary question which Radich will present on appeal is whether,
although the state may not punish words defiant or contemptuous of the
flag, it may nevertheless punish "acts" which are viewed by others to
symbolize similar ideas.2 If this threshold inquiry is viewed by the Court
18. ld.
19. Id. at 595.
20 Id. On remand, the New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and called for a new
trial solely for the action of burning the flag. People v. Street, 5 Cr. L. Rptr. 2285 (N.Y. Ct. App.
1969).
21. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
22. Justices Harlan, Brennan, Douglas, Marshall and Stewart composed the majority in Street.
Separate dissenting opinions were written by Chief Justice Warren, who has since retired, Justices
Black and White, and Justice Fortas, who has since resigned. Because there was no "speech"
involved in Radich's display of the flag art, as there was in Street, it seems unlikely that the Court
will review its limited decision in Street.
23, The most recent federal decisions are divided on the constitutionality of flag desecration
statutes. See Hodson v. Buckson, 310 F. Supp. 528 (D. Del. 1970) where the defendant flew the
United States flag in a left hand position subordinate to the United Nation flag and was convicted
under DEL CODE ANN. tit. I1, § 532 (1953), which is almost identical in language to the federal
flag legislation, 18 U.S.C. § 700 (Supp. 1970). The United States District Court of Delaware
Vol. 1970: 5171
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as controlled under the rationale of O'Brien, the question for
determination becomes whether the specific tests announced in that
decision are satisfied by the New York flag desecration law.
overturned the conviction and held the statute unconstitutionally overbroad. "In the present case,
although non-speech elements are present in the conduct regulated, the statute is so broad that it
strikes where no interest is served other than the proscription of expression." Id. at 534. The court,
although recognizing the state's interest in preserving public order, found that the statute was not so
limited. But see United States v. Ferguson, 302 F. Supp. I II1 (N.D. Cal. 1969), where the
defendant while attending a protest rally burned an American flag on the court house steps.
Appealing his conviction under the federal flag desecration statute, the defendant argued that his
political protest was protected by the first amendment. Perhaps because burning on the court house
steps was illegal regardless of the fuel used for the fire, the District Court merely held that the
conviction was within the confines of the requirements of O'Brien, without explaining the basis for
this conclusion. In United States v. Dratz, 6 Cr. L. Rptr. 2336 (Navy Ct. Mil. Rev. 1970), the
defendant, a sailor, wrote the word "revolution" on the United States flag and was convicted under
18 U.S.C. § 700 (Supp. 1970). On appeal, the defendant claimed that his action was a patriotic one
designed to demonstrate the "continuing nature of the American revolution", and that the statute
was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The court dismissed the arguments on the basis that
the defendant was convicted for his act of defacing the flag and not for his expression. In Hoffman v.
United States, 256 A.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1969) the defendant was convicted for wearing a shirt made
to look like an American flag with political protest buttoms attached. On appeal, the court upheld
the conviction under O'Brien.
Recent state court decisions are also in a state of confusion. In People v. Keough, 61 Misc.2d 762,
305 N.Y.S.2d 961 (Monroe County Ct. 1969), the defendant published pictures in a student
periodical of an otherwise nude female clothed in an American flag. On appeal from a demurrer to
the indictment under the New York desecration statute, the court held the indictment sufficient
under the decision in Radich. In Commonwealth v. Janoff, 439 Pa. 212, 266 A.2d 657 (1968), the
defendant during a Fourth of July parade displayed a United States flag with several phrases on it.
Convicted under the Pennsylvania statute that punishes anyone who displays a United States flag
with any words on it, but "does not apply to any patriotic or political demonstration", his
conviction was upheld on appeal by a divided court. The dissenting opinion argued that the
defendant was denied equal protection of the laws. Then in Commonwealth v. Sgerbati, 7 Cr. L.
Rptr. 2167 (Ct. Comm. PI. Phil. 1970), the court overturned a conviction of a defendant who wore
an American flag to his draft induction on the ground that the defendant did not cast contempt on
the flag but had instead kept it clean and tidy, and in dicta cast serious doubt on the
constitutionality of the statute. In Long Island Moratorium Comm. v. Cahn, 39 U.S.L.W. 2016
(E.D.N.Y. 1970), the defendants were convicted under the New York desecration statute for using
decals fashioned out of a combination "peace" symbol and United States flag design. The court
upheld the statute's constitutionality but overturned the conviction on the basis that the flag
definition section of the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad. In People v. Cowgill, 274 Adv.
Cal. App. 174, 78 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 371 (1970), the Supreme Court
dismissed an appeal from the lower court's conviction on the basis that the record did not
adequately flush the narrow and predicated issue of whether there was any communicative element
in the defendant's conduct of wearing a vest fashioned out of a cut-up American flag. In Hinton v.
State, 233 Ga. 174, 154 S.E.2d 246 (1967), the defendant was convicted of lowering the flag to half-
mast during a civil rights demonstration, at which point others removed the flag, tore it and shook it
in the faces of police officers.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1970/iss4/7
FLAG DESECRATION
A. Incidental Suppression of Artistic Expression
The dominant issue as viewed by the New York Court of Appeals was
whether a state's proscription of certain acts directed toward or
involving the use of the American flag furthers an important and
substantial governmental interest and whether that interest is unrelated
to the suppression of otherwise free expression. The New York Court of
Appeals went to some length to make clear that Radich was convicted
for the "act" of displaying the art in question rather than for any
expression or protest made through the medium of art.24 This approach
was dictated by the Supreme Court's earlier encounter with the New
York flag desecration statute in Street, where the Court expressly left
undecided whether a state might constitutionally protect the flag from
acts of desecration and contempt.75 Although Radich argued throughout
his state appeals that the display of art work is a protected "form of
expression",2 the court of appeals summarily rejected his contention as
untenable. In light of the fact that Radich displayed the art
commercially for sale, the court's characterization of the defendant's
acts as symbolic conduct embodying both speech and non-speech
elements seems difficult to question. The initial question confronting the
court of appeals was whether the state may incidentally suppress the
expression through the regulation of the public display. The Supreme
Court stated in O'Brien:
I ..We can not accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of
conduct can be labeled "speech" whenever the person engaged in the
conduct intends thereby to express an idea. . .[and]. . .when "speech"
and "non-speech" elements are combined in the same course of conduct,
a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the non-
speech elements can justify incidental limitations of first amendment
freedom.27
Under O'Brien then, the mere fact that the defendant displayed
24. The Court of Appeals never expressly mentions in its opinion what the defendant's intent was
by holding the display. 26 N.Y.2d at - 257 N.E.2d at 32, 308 N.Y.2d at 849. Instead, they
construed the statute as malum prohibitum and therefore requiring only a general intent to
commit the acts which were the basis for the conviction. In this respect, the court merely stated that
the proprietor of the art gallery stood in no better position than the artist who originally included
the flag in his constructions. See id. at -_, 257 N.E.2d at 36, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 849.
25. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 594 (1969).
26 See People v. Radich, 53 Misc.2d 717, 279 N.Y.S.2d 680 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. 1967), affd, 57
Misc 2d 1082, 294 N.Y.S.2d 285 (Sup. Ct. 1968); United States Flag Foundation, Inc. v. Radich,
53 Misc 2d 597, 279 N.Y.S.2d 233 (1967).
27. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
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"protest art" does not provide blanket immunity under the first
amendment from otherwise valid state regulation. The significance of the
medium employed by the defendant (and the artist) may, however, play a
role in determining whether the state's interest is sufficiently important
to justify incidental suppression of the expression conveyed by that
conduct. Thus, were the Supreme Court to decide generally that "art"
serves as a potent form of communication for ideas, much as parades
have been characterized as the "poor man's printing press", it follows
that the governmental interest in regulation must be "essential" 28 as
mandated under the fourth O'Brien requirement.
B. Molding O'Brien to "Fighting Conduct": Halter Revisted
The court of appeals, testing the flag desecration statute under the
requirements of O'Brien, considered the critical issue presented by
Radich-and earlier by Street29-to be whether regulation of conduct
under the flag desecration statute was in furtherance of a substantial
governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of first amendment
expression. Relying heavily on Halter, the court concluded that the
legislative purpose underlying the desecration statute was to prevent
breaches of the peace by those likely to react unlawfully in retaliation to
conduct thought insulting to or contemptuous of the flag. 3° Thus, the
court concluded that the statute was reasonably intended to prevent, by
discouraging the commission of provocative conduct in public, possible
disruptions of public order likely to flow from public insults to the flag.
It is unquestionable that the state has a legitimate and substantial
interest in preserving public order. The critical issue (recognized
indirectly as such by the court of appeals) is whether the proscription of
the defendant's conduct is, as required by O'Brien, in furtherance of that
interest. This question can be answered affirmatively only if Radich's
display was likely to be considered an insult to the flag by others in the
community, and if those viewing his conduct in this manner would be
likely to escalate the insult into a breach of the peace. Responding to the
first point, the court stated that "Whether the defendant thinks so or
not, a reasonable man would consider the wrapping of a phallic symbol
28. Id. at 377. See Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. CT.
REV. 1, 9-12, 23-25, 29-32; SFiIKEs, THE INDIGNANT EYE: THE ARTIST AS SOCIAL CRITIC XXiii
(1969).
29. People v. Street, 20 N.Y.2d 231, 229 N.E.2d 187, 282 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1967), rev'd, 394 U.S.
576 (1969).
30. 26 N.Y.2d at -, 257 N.E.2d at 36, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 85 1.
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with the flag an act of dishonor .... ,,3" The court made no reference to
any evidence either in or outside the record to support this conclusion.
Considered in light of the recent variety of commercial and non-
commercial exploitations of the American flag and its design 32 that
conclusion is clearly one which the Supreme Court may be unwilling to
blindly accept. Granting for a moment that the court was correct in its
assessment of the likely opinion of the art by a reasonable person, the
only remaining issue for the court was whether the legislature could have
reasonably concluded that these "reasonable" men would be likely to
react violently to acts they viewed contemptuous of the flag. Radich
answered affirmatively, although perhaps unknowingly, by reliance on
Halter. In Halter, the Supreme Court observed that "Insults to the flag
have been the cause of war, and indignities put upon it, in the presence of
those who revere it, have often been resented and sometimes punished on
the spot."' Halter was not, as is apparent from its language, referring to
the reactions of reasonable men, but instead was considering the likely
reactions of patriotic men. This distinction is not without importance.
First, it suggests that a reasonable man for the New York Court of
Appeals is the judicial equivalent of a patriotic man, rather than a citizen
who would refrain from violence unless legally justified. This
construction suggests why the conduct of the defendant was considered
by the court, without much effort, to be an act of dishonor in the eyes of
the reasonable observer. Instead of being required to make an empirical
study of the propensities of the "average" New York citizen, the court
instead was free to impute to the hypothetical patriot those qualities
subjectively believed appropriate, and perhaps desired, in a patriotic
citizen. Obviously, the net effect of this rationale is to build into the
statute a judicial means of protecting the American flag from the loss of
its status as a national symbol. This rationale further renders irrelevant
any assessment of contemporary exploitations of the flag. This is so
because the rationale mandates prohibition without exception of conduct
directed at an item which, because of its special status, is deemed
irrebutably to hold a position of reverence.u On the surface at least,
31 Id at 123, 257 N.E.2d at 35, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 852.
32. See Time, July 6, 1970, at 8-15; Life, March 31, 1967, at 19-20; cases cited at note 22 supra.
33. 205 U.S. at 41.
34. While Justice Harlan's comment in Halter concerning "insults to the flag" has been used by
several courts, including Radich, as justification for the public order interest, it was actually stated
in Halter to conclude a long discussion on the special place of the flag in American life and how
deeply some Americans feel about it. The rationale for upholding the Nebraska statute, which
forbade the use of the flag or its design in advertising, was that such use would ". . . degrade and
Vol. 1970: 517]
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Radich holds that the New York flag desecration statute prohibits
conduct likely to provoke breaches of the peace. Underlying that holding
is a subtle construction of the statute which permits a judgment by the
judge or jury of the provocative quality of the act and of the propensities
of those observing it. Although this construction may be viewed as
unacceptable by advocates of absolute first amendment protection, it is
not without significant constitutional support.
By its construction of the statute the court of appeals has in effect
carved out, under the O'Brien rationale, a "fighting conduct" exception
to first amendment protection of symbolic conduct. This conceptual
approach parallels the limitations placed on freedom of speech by the
Supreme Court under the "fighting words" doctrine. One of the
landmark "fighting words" decisions, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,"
illustrates the similarities. In that case, defendant was convicted under a
New Hampshire statute which prohibited any person from addressing
.. . any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any other person who
is lawfully in any street . . . nor call him by any offensive or derisive
name . . . with intent to deride, offend, or annoy him. . . ." The
defendant in the midst of an encounter with a police officer called the
officer a "God damned racketeer" and a "damned Fascist". Following
conviction for his exclamations, the defendant appealed to the Supreme
Court alleging that the statute violated his first amendment rights. As a
preliminary matter, the Court made it clear that first amendment
protection is not absolute, stating:
[I]t is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute
under all circumstances. There are certain well defined and narrowly
limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have
never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the
lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting
cheapen the flag in the estimation of the people, as well as to defeat the object of maintaining it as an
emblem of national honor." Id. at 42. See also Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 616-17 (1969)
(Fortas, J., dissenting); Hinton v. State, 223 Ga. 174, 154 S.E.2d 246 (1967). Justice Harlan in
Halter apparently was holding that the flag desecration statute might be construed in such a way as
to maintain the flag as a national symbol. See Note, Desecration of National Symbols as Protected
Political Expression, 66 MICH. L. REv. 1040, 1053 (1966). Clearly Radich would be unable to
persuasively argue that his conduct was so minor in comparison with other acts of commercial use
of the flag as to be immune from prosecution. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. I I, 127-28 (1942).
On the other hand, the non-violent acceptance by the general public of various exploitations of the
flag suggests that Radich's conduct was far from being "likely" to provoke retaliation from visitors
to the art gallery. This suggests that the flag no longer maintains the reverence that it held when
Halter was decided.
35. 315 U.S. 568 (1941).
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words" -those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite
an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such
utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality.3'
The Court then noted that the New Hampshire legislation was intended
to prevent breaches of the peace, an interest thought to be clearly within
the domain of state power. Because the legislative purpose was unrelated
to the suppression of protected expression, the principal question
presented to the Court was whether the criminal statute was narrowly
drawn and limited to speech falling within the unprotected categories.
The Court held that the statute met that obligation under the first
amendment because of the narrow construction glossed onto the statute
by the state courts, which had construed "offensive" to include only
utterances which "men of common intelligence would understand would
be words likely to cause an average addressee to fight. 13 7 Moreover, the
36. Id- at 571-72.
37. Id- at 573. "The statute, as construed, does no more than prohibit the face-to-face words
plainly likely to cause a breach of the peace by the addressee, words whose speaking constitute a
breach of the peace by the speaker-including 'classical fighting words', in current use less 'classical'
but equally likely to cause violence, and other disorderly words. . ." Id.
38. Radich, both before the Court of Appeals and in his brief to the Supreme Court, has argued
that the New York flag desecration statute is unconstitutional on grounds of vagueness and
overbreadth. See People v. Radich, 26 N.Y.2d 114, 257 N.E.2d 30, 36, 308 N.Y.S.2d 846, 854
(1970); Brief for Appellant at 24,29, Radich v. New York, appeal docketed, No. 169, 39
U S L W 3113 (U.S. May 18, 1970). The Court of Appeals dismissed both arguments summarily,
stating that the statute was clear enough to apprise any person of ordinary intelligence as to what
was permitted and prohibited, citing Hoffman v. United States, 256 A.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1969) and
People v Cowgill, 78 Cal. Rptr. 853 (App. Dept. Super. Ct. 1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 371
(1970). While numerous other decisions have upheld similar statutes on this basis, e.g., Joyce v.
United States, 259 A.2d 363 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Long Island Moratorium Comm. v. Cahn, 39
U S L W. 2016 (E.D.N.Y. 1970); Hinton v. State, 223 Ga. 174, 154 S.E.2d 246 (1967); the precise
issue has never been answered by the Supreme Court. A recent decision by the District Court of
Delaware, Hodson v. Buckson, 310 F. Supp. 528 (D. Del. 1970), however, struck down the
Delaware flag desecration statute as unconstitutionally overbroad. The court stated that "Here the
statute is so broad that it strikes where no interest is served other than the proscription of
expression." Id. at 534. What the court meant was that the statute was fatally overbroad because it
permitted the state to promote an interest related to the suppression of expression contrary to the
dictates of O'Brien. Because the Delaware statute was almost identical to the New York desecration
law, Hodson is relied on heavily by the appellant Radich in his brief to the Supreme Court. The
difficulty with Hodson, however, is that its argument was based on the assumption that an
incidental suppression of expression, permissable under O'Brien, is equivalent to an independent
state interest in suppression, impermissable under O'Brien. O'Brien did not suggest that such an
equation should or could be made under its rationale. In fact, had the Court meant what the
Delaware District court has suggested, the statement in O'Brien that some incidental suppression
Vol. 1970: 517]
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Court held that this narrow and explicit construction of the statute
prevented the statute from being unconstitutionally vague. 38
The "reasonable man" (patriotic, of average intelligence, etc.)
approach which the court of appeals in Radich used as the touchstone
for "fighting conduct" appears to be an imprecise formulation of the
rationale approved in Chaplinsky. In Chaplinsky, a highly subjective
assessment was required of the provocative nature of the expressions
made and of the probable reactions of those to whom the expressions
were addressed. The question was whether the legislature could have
reasonably classified as provocative the defendant's expressions. The
Court in Chaplinsky chose to uphold the trial court's affirmative
resolution regarding the defendant's specific statements.
While Radich raises an analogy between fighting words and conduct,
it fails to defend the application of either concept to the facts presented
on appeal. This failure results from the court of appeals' apparent
satisfaction that the defendant's conduct need only be provocative to
lose its protection as symbolic conduct under the first amendment. A
long line of Supreme Court decisions, including Chaplinsky, indicates,
however, that this premise is erroneous. For example, Chaplinsky does
not hold that any provocative speech may be punished. Instead, the
Court carefully limited the "fighting words" doctrine to speech which,
due to its nature and low ideological content, is of slight social value."
As explained in Chaplinsky, the state's interest in public order outweighs
the interest extended by the first amendment to speech which is not
essential to the exposition of ideas and of minimal value as a political
expression.40 The defendant's exclamation to the police officer in
Chaplinsky that he was a "God damned Facist" was considered by the
Court to fall within that classification. On the other hand, peaceful
desegregation marches and demonstrations in Southern locales,
although extremely provocative, have consistently been viewed outside of
Chaplinsky, apparently because such demonstrations have traditionally
was permissable would be meaningless. In any event, the reliance on a "fighting conduct" concept
by the Court of Appeals as a gloss on the New York statute may well avoid the difficulties of
vagueness and overbreadth. This is because the Supreme Court decided in Chaplinsky that the
statute there in question was not constitutionally defective under either of those tests, because of the
gloss placed on that statute by the New Hampshire state court that construction was almost
identical to the construction read into the New York statute by the Court of Appeals.
39. 315 U.S. at 572; cf. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. at 296, 310 (1939).
40. 315 U.S. at 572.
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served protesters for persuasive communication of political dissent. 41
The court of appeals in Radich made no attempt to decide whether flag
art might serve as potentially effective means of ideological expression,
or whether art in the form utilized by Radich was of slight social value.
There is no indication, moreover, that any evidence was offered at trial
by either the prosecution or the defendant on this issue. As a result, if the
Supreme Court elects to pursue an application of the Chaplinsky
rationale under O'Brien, it will be forced to do so on the basis of its own
predelictions of the effectiveness of art for political expression.42
41. See Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 1!1, 114 (1969) (Black, J., concurring); Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Terminello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1948) ("... [A]
function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve
its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction . . . .or even stirs
people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging."); cf. Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S.
526, 535-36 (1963); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16 (1958) (delay sought in desegregation plan by
School Board on ground of extreme public hostility); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 81 (1917).
But see Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966). See generally Monaghan, First Amendment "Due
Process", 83 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1970); Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963); Note,'Injuria Non Excusat Injuriam: Unconstitutional
Injunctions and the Duty to Obey, 1970 WASH. U.L.Q. 51.
42. Unlike desegregation marches and demonstrations or exclamations as in Chaplinsky, in
Radich, the defendant displayed the art forms in a quiet upstairs gallery with no evidence of any
public arousal or possible violence. Although the court of appeals in Radich did not undertake to
balance the interests of the state in preserving public order with those of the defendant in unfettered
expression, pursuit of Chaplinsky's rationale by the Supreme Court would presumably require such
a balance. The comparatively private display of the flag art in Radich may weigh heavily against the
New York court's reliance on Halter to demonstrate the danger of potential breaches of the peace.
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